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Populism 
David Featherstone and Lazaros Karaliotas  
What are the possibilities - and potential problems - of left populism?  
 
Populism has emerged as one of the most vexed, over-used but least defined terms of the 
current conjuncture. Mobilised in a significant array of different ways and with a diversity of 
meanings and intentions, it is also, unusually, a term that is associated with both the political 
right and the left. At its broadest, populism refers to forms of politics that put ‘the people’ at 
their centre. Within this, the way ‘the people’ is understood varies widely, and questions of 
left populism have gained significant traction and engagement in the period since the 2008 
‘more than economic’ crisis. This makes understanding the term, the different ways it is used 
and envisioned, and the kind of left strategies with which it is associated, a key, if slippery, 
task. It also makes critically intervening in some of the different articulations of populism a 
task which has significant stakes in terms of its bearing on left political analysis and 
strategies.1  
This article considers how both right-wing and left-wing articulations of populism have been 
understood, but develops a particular focus on understanding the potential and limits of left 
populist practices. The first section considers Ernesto Laclau’s analysis of populism in On 
Populist Reason, arguably the most influential account of populist politics of recent times. 
Rooted in his broader discourseanalytical approach to the political, Laclau’s account 
proposes a minimal definition of populist politics; seeks to rescue populism from pejorative 
attacks which associate appeals to ‘the people’ with demagoguery; and positions it as 
constitutive of the political. While recognising the significance of Laclau’s analysis, we argue, 
however, that his work is hindered by his overly formalist account of the political. To offer 
an alternative, in the second section we turn to Stuart Hall’s writings on Thatcherism, which 
offer a more contextual and situated engagement with particular populist strategies, and 
which have continuing relevance for understanding some contemporary far right 
articulations of the populist political terrain.  
The final section explores some of the actually existing experiences of left populism in 
contemporary Europe, to draw out both the strengths and the weaknesses of these 
strategies. Focusing on Podemos and Syriza, we argue that left populist strategies have been 
significant in challenging the hegemony of austerity policies in the European-crisis 
conjuncture. However, we also probe three key areas where there are limitations in their 
strategies. These concern, firstly, questions of ‘nationed’ narratives around the crisis and 
ways out of it;2 secondly, the relationship between leadership and grassroots politics; and, 
thirdly, the ways they engage with internationalist political projects.  
Laclau’s theory of populism: limits to formalism  
Ernesto Laclau has been the most influential - and perhaps also the most controversial - 
theorist of populism in recent years. Over the past four decades, beginning with his early 
contributions in the 1970s and culminating in the publication of On Populist Reason, Laclau’s 
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work has powerfully challenged pejorative understandings of populism that reduce populist 
politics to a reactionary, demagogic, nativist and often authoritarian ideology.3 Such 
pejorative understandings, for Laclau, feed on the conceptual ambiguity of academic, 
popular and political engagements with populism, and mirror liberal political thinking that 
reduces democratic politics to techno-managerial governance tactics by denigrating ‘the 
people’ as ignorant and irrational masses.4 Alongside his critiques of such approaches, Laclau 
has sought to define populism in what he calls a ‘strictly formal’ way - as a form of politics 
that seeks to articulate and construct political identities and practices within a specific logic. 
Populism for Laclau, thus, entails two minimal characteristics: populist politics, first, revolve 
around the nodal point of ‘the people’, and, second, construct an antagonistic 
representation of society, dividing the social field in two opposing camps: on one side ‘the 
people’ - the underdogs, the many, the 99% - and on the other ‘the elite’ - the 
establishment, the few, the 1%.5  
At the core of Laclau’s interventions lies the key theoretical move to conceive of the ‘people’ 
as a political category, rather than a given of the social structure. Building also on his work 
with Chantal Mouffe in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, Laclau argues that ‘the people’ are 
not a pre-given population but are constantly constructed and demarcated through the 
‘discursive frontiers’ that populist discourses draw between them and a ‘constitutive 
outside’ - the enemy, against which ‘the people’ is constituted.6 Populist discourses, thus, 
institute ‘the people’, creating a new agency out of a plurality of political demands.7 For 
Laclau, demands - or more accurately social demands - that cannot be accommodated 
within the current institutional order are the building blocks for populism. When a number 
of such demands remain unsatisfied, grievances may escape their specificity, and they can 
then be politically and discursively linked together (articulated) in such a way as to create 
new forms of solidarity. Laclau and Mouffe refer to this process as making ‘chains of 
equivalence’. Populist politics and leaders, thus, capitalise on such unmet demands to 
initiate a process of political identification, and construct ‘the people’ as a political actor 
demanding change against the existing institutional order.8  
In understanding ‘the people’ as a political actor in the making, and populism as a specific 
logic in the articulation of ‘the people’, Laclau’s work has opened up important new avenues 
in thinking through populist politics from a left perspective. Rather than sweepingly equating 
populism with reactionary right-wing ideologies, Laclau usefully draws attention to the - 
often conflicting - ways in which diverse populist discourses construct and interpellate their 
respective ‘people’. This emphasis on the diverse constructions of the people and the 
discursive frontiers that different populist politics articulate is particularly useful in the 
current conjuncture in Europe and the US, which is marked by the concomitant upsurge of 
both leftwing and right-wing populisms. It not only allows for more nuanced readings of 
populist politics; it also offers important analytical and theoretical tools in thinking through 
the possibilities and limitations of left populism.  
Nevertheless, Laclau’s insistence on a formalist reading of populism is also the terrain upon 
which his theory encounters some key tensions and limitations, since formalism tends to 
obscure the specific histories and geographies that shape political activity. Firstly, there is an 
at least implicit tendency in Laclau’s work on populism to elide the spaces of the political 
3 
 
with the spaces of the nation-state.9 While his theorisation enables a dynamic and plural 
sense of the making of ‘the people’ through antagonisms and solidarities, this construction 
remains largely inscribed within the given space of the nation-state. As Matthew Sparke 
argues, the effect of this ‘built-in territorialisation of the political’ is to close down ‘sites of 
radical and plural democracy … within the larger space of differences that is the nation-
state’.10 It also obscures the constitutive role of transnational connections in shaping, and 
being shaped by, populist politics.11  
Secondly - and this is of particular importance in a conjuncture marked by the upsurge of 
exclusionary if not outright racist discourses throughout Europe and the US - there is a 
danger of conflating ‘the people’ that populist politics construct and seek to represent with 
the citizens of a nation-state. As Etienne Balibar has convincingly argued, however, ‘the 
nation, or the national identity, however effective it has been in modern history, is only one 
of the possible institutional forms of the community of citizens, and it neither encapsulates 
all of its functions nor completely neutralizes its contradictions’.12 Indeed, Jacques Rancière 
usefully distinguishes between the demos and the ethnos as the two names of ‘the people’. 
While the ethnos signifies the construction of the people as ‘the living body of those who 
have the same origin, are born on the same soil or worship the same god’, the demos points 
to ‘the count of the uncounted’, and transcends any quality that could be construed as 
‘given’.13 ‘The life of the demos’, for Rancière, ‘is the ongoing process of its differentiation 
from the ethnos’.14  
Finally, as Benjamin Arditi among others has noted, Laclau’s reading of populism is also 
marked by a ‘strong attachment to a leader - which is in fact an attachment to a strong 
leader’.15 For Laclau, in populism ‘the equivalential logic leads to singularity, and singularity 
to the identification of the unity of the group with the name of the leader’.16 As Arditi 
argues, while the name of the leader is, for Laclau, an ‘empty signifier’ of popular unity - ‘the 
symbolic unification of the group around an individuality’ - the leader is also a person, and 
frequently male.17 In this sense, any discussion of the symbolic unity of the people under the 
leader also needs to address issues and critiques revolving around personality cult, the 
idealisation of the all-powerful leader and the implications these might have for an 
emancipatory democratic politics.  
As Hilary Wainwright has noted in relation to Jeremy Corbyn, particular forms of left 
leadership, including their relationship to broader movements, are malleable and not pre-
determined. She has argued that part of Corbyn’s appeal and distinctiveness has been his 
refusal of certain tropes of the charismatic, populist leader. Thus she contrasts Tony Benn, 
who ‘championed radical change through his charisma and established status as a leading 
politician’, with Corbyn, who she sees as having symbolised a ‘new effort to open the party 
to becoming a movement for radical change through his very modesty and daily support for 
others in struggle’.18 While Corbyn’s period as Labour leader has probably followed a more 
uneven and differentiated trajectory than Wainwright’s optimistic account allows, it is 
significant that such dispersed notions of leadership also imply a different understanding of 
the spaces through which politics take place, a shift away from those implied by the top-
down nature of a national party led by a strong, charismatic leader. This re-envisioning of 
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leadership opens up different sites and practices of left politics as having importance, and 
allows more dispersed and generous constructions of political agency.  
Thinking about populism spatially - that is, in a way that foregrounds the generative role of 
space and geography in the articulation of diverse populist projects - can help us to move 
beyond some of these tensions in Laclau’s work. Such a perspective entails an interest in the 
relationship of space and place to populist politics that is both theoretical and empirical. 
Indeed, recent political theory work has highlighted the importance of engaging with the 
spaces in and through which populist politics are performed.19 Rather than eliding the spaces 
of populist politics with the nation-state, an emphasis on the everyday spaces and political 
infrastructures that make populist politics possible opens up a plural understanding of the 
diverse range of places that populist politics shapes, and the different ways in which place is 
thought about in populist strategy. Zooming in on these spaces enables more nuanced 
readings of contemporary populist politics - both in the sense of unearthing the diverse 
repertoires, emotions and solidarities at work in different populist politics, and in terms of 
tracing the diverse trans-local connections and disconnections shaping and being shaped by 
populist politics. At the same time, charting the discursive topographies and geographical 
imaginations of different populist discourses can offer important insights into the ways in 
which they are constructed, including the ways in which they converge and diverge. To 
demonstrate the significance of such an approach, in the next section we turn to Stuart 
Hall’s engagement with populist political strategies in his writings on Thatcherism.  
Articulating populism  
In his essay ‘The empire strikes back’, written in April 1982, during the MalvinasFalklands 
conflict, Stuart Hall argued that, while the Falklands crisis may ‘have been unpredicted’, the 
‘way it has been constructed into a populist cause is not’.20 Hall understood the conflict as 
‘the apogee of the whole arc of Thatcherite populism’: as he had recognised for some time, 
this was a political project that understood how to intervene in events as they arose, in ways 
that reinforced its ‘common-sense’ view of how the world worked. In 1982, Thatcher had 
only been in power for three years and her government was deeply unpopular; and the war 
with Argentina was to play a very significant role in reversing this unpopularity and winning 
the 1983 general election.  
Hall’s analysis allowed him to immediately recognise the importance of the Thatcher 
government’s response to the Malvinas-Falklands crisis. His account provides a very clear 
and helpful illustration of how to understand a populist project of this kind - and what is at 
stake in doing so. He also noted that by populism he meant ‘something more than the ability 
to secure electoral support for a political programme’: for him, populism referred to ‘the 
project, central to the politics of Thatcherism, to ground neoliberal politics directly in an 
appeal to “the people”; to root them in the essentialist categories of commonsense 
experience and practical moralism’.21  
Hall’s account here draws attention to the ways in which populism can function as an 
integral part of particular kinds of political projects. This is significant, as in recent media and 
popular debates populism has been counterposed with the political, and seen as something 
that inevitably undermines constructions of politics.22 His essay is also significant in 
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demonstrating how constructions of ‘the people’ can be actively shaped in particular ways 
through populist projects: they are not a given force just waiting to be mobilised. Indeed the 
terms and practices through which such populist projects are envisioned are constitutive of 
their political character in important ways. Hall’s analysis of the Malvinas-Falklands War also 
signals the ways in which at ‘different stages’ of this ‘populist project’ different themes were 
drawn into service in an attempt to ‘capture common sense for populism and the right’.23  
Of particular significance here was the way he drew attention to the manner in which the 
Falklands War drew on a set of ‘imperial’ histories and imaginaries - and re-centred them at 
the ‘heart’ of constructions of ‘the people’. This is significant: populism is often constructed 
as a rather vague, place-less phenomenon, but Hall’s analysis located it directly in relation to 
particular contests, histories and geographies. This was, and remains, an important 
intervention in terms of the ways in which populism is thought and understood.  
Hall’s writings from this period not only sought to engage with the emergent right-wing 
populist strategies associated with Thatcherism; they also critically intervened in the terms 
on which the histories and geographies of populism were understood. Hall’s writings on 
Thatcherism drew on Laclau’s critique of class-reductionist accounts of populism to analyse 
the diverse political constituencies that were integral to Thatcher’s populist project. He also, 
however, critically engaged with some of Laclau’s positions. He argued, for example, that 
Laclau’s approach led to expectations of ‘the constant formation and reformation of 
discourses across the ideological field’. In this respect Laclau’s work, Hall asserted, took ‘too 
little into consideration the fact that the articulation of certain discourses to the practices of 
particular classes has been secured over long periods’.24 His own engagement with particular 
populist formations such as Thatcherism was explicitly attentive to the situated dynamics of 
such politics - including their inter-connections with longerterm historical processes - in 
ways which are often missed by Laclau’s formalist approach. Hall was insistent that 
formations such as the intensely racialised populism that was central to the political 
settlement emerging in the 1970s and 1980s were shaped by specific histories and 
geographies.  
In this regard, as Hall’s discussion of the Falklands War emphasises, imperial practices and 
imaginaries have been particularly significant in shaping different articulations of populism. 
These have long histories and continue to shape the terrain on which forms of populist 
politics are envisioned. Bill Schwarz has described, for example, the forms of ‘energetic 
white populism’ that were shaped in South Africa and Australia in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth century, in opposition to nonwhite workers and ‘against distant rulers in 
London’.25 Such populist imaginaries were shaped by circuits of ‘white labourism’ 
throughout the Empire, and were reproduced through connections between imperial and 
metropolitan spaces; and these racialised understandings of labour also intersected with 
popular working-class articulations of politics within Britain.26 Positioning populism in 
relation to this broad historical terrain does not provide answers to all the questions relating 
to the terms on which populist politics and moments are articulated. It does, however, help 
to move beyond some of the superficial ways in which populism has been understood in 
recent debates, both politically and analytically.  
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Engaging with the long histories and geographies through which particular racialised forms 
of politics and imaginaries have been articulated is a necessary precondition for 
understanding how specific constructions of populism get articulated and generated on 
specific terms. To understand the populist constructions of the ‘people’ during the Brexit 
referendum, for example, it is necessary to scrutinise some of the particular ways such 
constructions of the ‘people’ have mobilised long-standing racialising discourses of the 
nation. The United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), as Satnam Virdee and Brendan 
McGeever note, ‘was able to gain traction by tapping into a sedimented racist nationalist 
populism that has been a feature of the English social formation for a number of decades’. 
Such racism gains traction ‘not simply through the circulation of racist ideas within 
mainstream political discourse, but because such ideas have been part of the lived habitus of 
the English social formation for so long’.27  
This mobilisation of racialised articulations of the nation is a pervasive feature of the 
different right-wing articulations of populism emerging in contemporary Europe. As Marina 
Prentoulis has argued, the ‘national element has been appropriated by successful right-wing 
populisms, which are pushing away from the European project and towards the re-
enactment of state boundaries as a means of finding security from external threats - and at 
this particular conjunction their main focus is on the refugee crisis’.28 Prentoulis also usefully 
argues that these strategies ‘cannot be countered by a left populism that confines itself to 
national boundaries’ - a position that raises important questions about the terms on which 
left populisms have sought to construct antagonistic constructions of ‘the people’. The next 
section turns to a discussion of what we might term actually existing forms of left populism, 
through a discussion of Syriza and Podemos.  
Actually existing left populisms: ‘Syriza, Podemos, Venceremos’?  
Two of the most palpable and - at least electorally - successful articulations of a left populist 
strategy in contemporary Europe come from the recent trajectories of Podemos in Spain and 
Syriza in Greece. In the aftermath of the ‘more than economic’ European crisis, and the 
continuous legitimisation and brutal implementation of austerity as the only possible 
response to it, both parties have mobilised populist strategies to articulate and represent 
popular grievances and demands. Fuelled by the massive popular protests that had recently 
marked the political landscape in the two countries, the populist projects of Syriza and 
Podemos have managed to challenge the dogmatic implementation of austerity politics and 
to re-invigorate democratic debate and disagreement. Indeed, their political strategies have 
been powerful in opening up institutional spaces for the representation of popular demands 
and grievances, while also moving beyond techno-managerial responses to Eurozone’s crisis, 
and foregrounding alternatives to austerity. Nevertheless, the current impasses, 
contradictions and failures of both parties also call for a more nuanced reading of their 
strategies. And here some useful insights can be gained from focusing in on the different 
spaces - and ways of thinking about space - in and through which the populist politics of 
Syriza and Podemos have been articulated; and a consideration of the role of 
spatial/geographical imaginaries in the ways they have articulated their politics is also 
helpful.  
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Concerning the latter, it is important to note that both Syriza and Podemos have been quick 
to equate ‘the people’ they seek to represent with their respective nations. Perhaps the 
most palpable manifestation of this conflation of ‘the people’ with the nation is the way 
Podemos articulates and emphasises the national-popular. The term ‘national popular’ was 
used by Gramsci to refer to articulations of popular will in a particular relation with a 
national history and a historical and cultural environment, and without any necessary 
positivity to the nation form itself. Nevertheless, Íñigo Errejón, in a conversation with 
Chantal Mouffe, has recently argued for the need to ‘combat right wing populism’ by a 
refusal to ‘cede’ the space of the nation to ‘them’, and to ‘rebuild a civic, popular idea of the 
country’ framed by ‘a democratic, progressive and popular patriotism’.29 Errejón notes that 
in this strategy Podemos are ‘learning from Latin America’, especially in relation to 
constructions of the national-popular. However, he does not give any consideration to the 
important role of Latin Americans in shaping oppositional political cultures within Spain.30 
But immigrants to Spain from countries such as Ecuador and Peru have been increasingly 
visible in movements against austerity. As Sophie Gonick has noted, Ecuadorian immigrants, 
‘who were the first victims of crisis after purchasing homes at the height of the bubble’ have 
been central to grassroots mobilisations against evictions in Madrid.31 Engaging with these 
kinds of connections can help to re-draw our cartographies of left populisms, and to find 
different ways of relating to internationalist trajectories and collaborations, in all their rich 
diversity.  
In a similar vein, despite the party’s origins as a grouping of left-wing parties and 
organisations, nationalist instances are equally present in Syriza’s discourse. Actually, 
between 2012 and 2015, before they won the election, Syriza spokespersons often adopted 
a nationalist rhetoric wherein their political opponents were portrayed as traitors of the 
nation.32 Alexis Tsipras, for example, described the previous pro-austerity governments as 
instruments in the hands of foreign interests. In his words, PASOK and New Democracy 
‘looted Greece and then they lowered the flag and handed it to Merkel’.33 Feeding on this 
rhetoric, the Syriza coalition government formed in 2015 came to power thanks to the 
party’s collaboration with the openly nationalist and xenophobic right-wing party ANEL 
(Independent Greeks). This is not to argue that Syriza’s populist discourse should be 
conflated with a nationalist discourse. Nevertheless, it is important to note that such 
recurring references to patriotism and national sovereignty not only shaped a nationed 
narrative of the ‘Greek crisis’; it also positioned Syriza’s efforts to imagine and articulate an 
alternative to austerity predominantly within the limited and limiting political space of the 
nation-state. In this context, Syriza’s failure to effect fundamental changes in austerity 
policies (after its election and the referendum of July 2015) within the European post-
democratic configuration has further fuelled nationed narratives, both within Syriza and, 
even more so, within Greek left-wing opposition parties.  
This is not to suggest that the strategies adopted by Syriza and Podemos have been 
exclusively located within the frame of the nation-state. Indeed, in the runup to the 
European Elections of 2014, the two parties actively worked together to construct a left 
populist alliance in Europe, under the electoral slogan: ‘Syriza, Podemos, Venceremos’. And 
yet, the terms on which the two parties have worked together also have continuities in 
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terms of their discourses of patriotism. In his discussion of the decision by Podemos to sit 
with Syriza in the European parliament, Errejón argues that:  
We’ve always defended the decision in patriotic terms. In fact we were in the group 
with Tsipras and Syriza, which are the only patriotic force that has defended the 
interests of the people and citizens of their country against international speculators. 
It’s a left that has put together an inclusive project for the country.34  
This further emphasises the political challenges which confront attempts to delineate 
different articulations of left populisms, and to move beyond patriotism as the grounds on 
which such international linkages are shaped.  
In relation to the issue of delineating left populism, it is important to foreground the shifting 
spaces through which the two parties have articulated their political projects. To begin with, 
it is paramount not to lose sight of the fact that the surge in support for both Podemos and 
Syriza came as a result of capitalising on, and succeeding in representing, a substantial 
section of the people who had been involved in the massive popular protests of 2011 - the 
Indignados in Spain and the Squares movement in Greece.35 A closer look at the spaces of 
the squares movement in Greece, for example, unearths the uneasy and porous but 
nonetheless constitutive co-existence of two opposing logics and imaginaries in the squares: 
a nationalist discourse seeking to oust the ‘occupation government’ and demanding ‘jobs for 
Greeks’ in the upper square, and an emancipatory egalibertarian discourse demanding direct 
democracy and experimenting with solidarity responses to austerity in the lower square.36 It 
is, indeed, this uneasy co-existence of a nationalist and emancipatory articulation of ‘the 
people’ in the squares that made imaginable and possible the government coalition 
between Syriza and ANEL four years later.  
In the years that followed the rupture introduced by the squares movement, Syriza would 
not only seek to represent the demos of the squares in the institutional spaces of the 
Parliament; it also actively participated in the massive wave of grassroots solidarity 
initiatives against austerity that thoroughly delegitimised the New Democracy government 
by constructing a network of mutual aid in the interstices of the existing order.37 Syriza’s 
participation in these political spaces was constitutive for the party. In the period between 
2011 and 2014 the party shaped its discourse and repertoires of action in dialogue with, and 
under the influences of, these movements. In fact, the spaces opened up by the solidarity 
movement constituted the terrain on which the populist politics of Syriza was shaped - while 
also being shaped by them. In a similar manner, Podemos would also develop a symbiotic 
and mutually constitutive relationship with grassroots movements against austerity, 
particularly with the movement against evictions. These spaces, thus, were not merely the 
backdrop for the activities of Syriza and Podemos. Rather, their populist projects were 
actively shaped and articulated through the opening of such movement spaces. Tracing the 
shifting spaces of the articulation of populist politics in this way helps to foreground its 
movement element. And this is an element that has been most prominently highlighted in 
the literature around Latin American populisms, which has drawn attention to the role of 
grassroots - often indigenous - movements in the articulations of populist projects led by 
men such as Evo Morales, Hugo Chavez and Rafeal Correa.38  
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It is no coincidence, therefore, that as the strategies of Podemos and Syriza began to 
diverge, their relationships to political spaces and spatial strategies also diversified. More 
specifically, after its electoral win in the 2014 European Elections, acquiring government 
power became the horizon of Syriza’s political project. And as the party began to 
increasingly privilege national institutional political spaces, and winning and maintaining a 
Parliamentary majority, its relationship with grassroots movements also began to weaken. 
Syriza began to tone down the more radical references to the movements’ discourse, while 
the party’s rhetoric and strategy was increasingly shaped in the higher echelons of party 
power close to Alexis Tsipras. Podemos, on the other hand, strongly influenced by its links 
with the urban political movements against evictions, also put considerable emphasis and 
effort into articulating its strategy at the local election and movement level. The 2015 local 
election wins of Ada Colau in Barcelona and Manuela Carmena in Madrid were fuelled by 
this strong relationship between movements and party. And this in turn opened up an 
alternative spatial strategy and a new set of institutional spaces for the articulation of 
popular politics - extending beyond Syriza’s almost exclusive emphasis on government 
power and the Parliament. These examples also show how a focus on the spaces in and 
through which left populisms are articulated can be helpful in the navigation of questions 
around the importance of the leader and strong leadership in populist politics, in that it 
offers a different way of registering and elucidating the relationship between movements 
and leaders.  
Conclusion  
Chantal Mouffe has argued that the ‘populist moment’ does not imply that ‘the left/right 
opposition is no longer relevant’, but, rather, that ‘it must be posed in another way, with 
reference on the type of populism at stake and the chains of equivalences through which the 
“people” is constructed’.39 We agree with Mouffe that it is important not to sweepingly 
dismiss all populist politics as reactionary, exclusionary or authoritarian. As we have argued 
above, the left populisms of Syriza and Podemos have been important in challenging the 
hegemony of austerity politics and opening up institutional and everyday spaces for the 
expression of democratic disagreement. However, as we have also insisted, both parties 
have to a large extent articulated their discourses along nationed geographical imaginations. 
This suggests the importance of critically engaging with left populisms, and the terms on 
which antagonistic constructions of ‘the people’ are articulated and mobilised.  
In this sense, we contend, after Laclau, that populist dimensions and articulations of the 
political are not something that can be ignored by the left, even if we would disagree with 
the way Laclau’s writings verge at times on eliding populism and the political. Our discussion 
of Hall’s work, however, has suggested the importance of engaging with situated 
articulations of populist politics in particular conjunctures. Accordingly, we would argue that 
it is crucial for left political engagement to scrutinise and displace some of the key tensions 
that structure actually existing articulations of left populism; and that such scrutiny is also 
integral to challenging populist articulations of the political from the right. We conclude 
therefore by summarising our arguments in relation to the three key areas we have been 
discussing.  
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Firstly, we have argued that there has been a tendency for left populist imaginaries to accept 
a narrowly nationed politics of the crisis. This is in some ways amplified by rather than 
unsettled by the centrality that Laclau and Mouffe give to the nation in accounts of 
populism. There are many different articulations of this in actually existing left populist 
politics, as we have suggested in relation to Syriza, but there are also echoes of such 
positions in the kind of ‘Lexit’ positions which seem to have some traction in the 
contemporary UK left. The nation, however, is not an inevitable geographical imaginary 
through which populism is necessarily articulated. As Etienne Balibar has recently argued, 
the ‘diverse resistances against austerity policies in Europe’ might as usefully be constructed 
in relation to a ‘transnational counter-populism’.40 How and with what analytical tools could 
we engage with a possibility of such a transnational left populism?  
Secondly, as we have discussed, there are real limitations in the ways in which populist 
constructions of the political conceive of the relations between leaderships and grassroots 
and participatory politics. In this regard Laclau’s re-centring of top-down leadership as 
central to populist politics is inherently problematic from a progressive left position. As 
Hilary Wainwright suggests, it is necessary to think about the ways in which spaces of politics 
might be envisioned which enhance different articulations of populist politics. This may open 
up different ways of envisioning political leadership, but for a left populist politics to 
function as part of a broader, more participatory, articulation of politics and society it is 
necessary to unsettle the notion of a charismatic male leader that is all too often refigured in 
appeals to left populisms.  
Finally, thinking about populism from a spatially-informed perspective can further enhance 
our thinking on how a transnational populism might become articulated. Interestingly 
enough, it is to the spaces of the Indignados and Occupy movements that De Cleen turns in 
looking for potential manifestations of transnational populism.41 And it is true that the 
political ideas and vocabularies of these movements include a spatial/geographical 
perspective that has enabled them to articulate the idea of a transnational people against 
national and transnational elites. Nevertheless, as our analysis of the squares movement in 
Greece has suggested, the spaces opened up by these movements have often constituted 
the terrain for negotiating conflicting articulations of ‘the people’. It is through 
foregrounding the spaces of populist politics, and the new ways of thinking about place that 
are opening up, that such nuances can be better elucidated. And it is also through these new 
spaces and networks - forged by grassroots solidarity activity across Europe - that a 
transnational European people might be in the making, as Balibar contends.42 The 
networked solidarities shaped by refugee and migrant activism and grassroots movements 
in the face of what the elites call ‘Europe’s refugee crisis’ represent perhaps the most 
palpable, and for sure the most hopeful, topography of such a people.43  
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